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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - DEFENDANT'S ABSENCE FROM
A STAGE OF THE TRIAL CAN CONSTITUTE HARMLESS ER-
ROR DESPITE MARYLAND RULE REQUIRING PRESENCE.
Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 446 A.2d 844 (1982).
During the voir dire of prospective jurors at Liston G. Noble's
trial, one venireman asked to approach the bench with the prosecutor
and the defense attorney.' In essence, the prospective juror admitted to
possible prejudice against the defendant because members of his family
had been the victims of an unsolved violent crime.2 Accordingly, the
judge excused that venireman from serving on the jury.3 The bench
conference took place in the defendant's absence. Noble was subse-
quently convicted on all counts.4
Three years later, the defendant filed a petition in criminal court
under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act5 attacking his con-
viction on several grounds.6 Noble argued that his right to be present
at every stage of the trial, as guaranteed by the Maryland Rules of Pro-
cedure,7 was violated during the voir dire of a prospective juror at a
bench conference at which the defendant was not present.' The post-
conviction court found that any violation of the defendant's right to be
1. Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 570, 446 A.2d 844, 854 (1982). The defendant was
tried on charges of felony murder, attempted armed robbery, and use of a hand-
gun in the commission of a violent crime. Id at 551, 446 A.2d at 845.
2. The following colloquy occurred at the bench:
THE JUROR: Part Four, I'm Mr. Roy. My father and brother were
both murdered in the city, no arrests have been made in the case.
THE COURT: Well I have a feeling that probably would make it
pretty difficult for you to sit on a jury of this kind. I'm going to excuse
you.
MR. ROY: All right, thank you.
(END OF BENCH CONFERENCE)
Id at 570, 446 A.2d at 854.
3. Id
4. Id at 551, 446 A.2d at 845. Noble appealed his conviction on issues concerning
the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and the prosecutor's closing ar-
gument. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the conviction in an
unreported opinion. The defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court
of Appeals of Maryland was subsequently denied. Id; see also Noble v. State, 281
Md. 741 (1977).
5. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A-J (1982 & Supp. 1982).
6. One of those grounds concerned whether the defendant had waived his right to be
present at the bench conference. The court noted that a recent decision, Williams
v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981), held that waiver could be found from
the defendant's failure to be present and by failing to object to the exclusion from
a bench conference. However, since Williams was rendered after Noble's original
trial, the court was bound by the former waiver rule which provided that the de-
fendant must personally and expressly waive his right to be present. Noble v.
State, 293 Md. 549, 556, 446 A.2d 844, 847 (1982).
7. Rule 724 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure states in pertinent part: "The de-
fendant shall be present at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the
jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as
provided by these rules." MD. R. P. 724.
8. The defendant testified that he was unfamiliar with the jury process, that the pro-
cess had not been explained to him, and that had he known of his right to be
present was harmless error because the potentially biased juror had
been excused.'
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland found it dif-
ficult to understand how the defendant could have been injured by his
absence from the conference; nevertheless, the court reversed the appli-
cation of the harmless error doctrine because "the cases are legion that
the Maryland Rules are precise rubrics to be read and followed."'" In
Noble v. State, " I the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the doc-
trine of harmless error can apply to the Maryland Rules of Procedure,
and that a procedural error, such as failing to include a defendant at a
bench conference, does not necessarily require the reversal of a defend-
ant's conviction.' 2 The Noble court found harmless error present in
this case because a defendant would not normally suffer prejudice from
being absent from a bench conference which results in the dismissal of
a potentially biased juror.'3 Because the conversation occurred at the
bench, the court further reasoned that the other prospective jurors were
not tainted with prejudice against the defendant.' 4 Thus, the court
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Noble was not harmed by his
absence from the voir dire bench conference. ' 5
The dissenting judge in Noble feared that the application of the
harmless error principle to a denial of a defendant's right to be present
resulted in an evisceration of that right.' 6 Furthermore, the dissent de-
clared that the majority was changing the harmless error standard from
beyond a reasonable doubt to "bald speculation as to what the defend-
ant may or may not have done had he been present."' 7
Although all jurisdictions generally endorse the use of the harm-
present he would have asserted it. Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 552-53, 446 A.2d
844, 845-46 (1982).
9. Id at 552 n.5,446 A.2d at 849 n.5. The test for harmless error in Maryland crimi-
nal cases was set forth in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976) as
follows:
[When an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a re-
viewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to
declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way
influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed 'harmless' and a
reversal is mandated. Id at 659, 350 A.2d at 678.
10. Noble v. State, 46 Md. App. 154, 156, 416 A.2d 757, 759 (1980), rev'd, 293 Md.
549, 446 A.2d 844 (1982).
11. 293 Md. 549, 446 A.2d 844 (1982).
12. Id at 558, 446 A.2d at 848. However, the court did note that violations of certain
procedural rules could rarely be classified as harmless error. These rules in-
cluded: rule 723(c), (d), (e) (waiver of right to counsel); rule 731(c) (acceptance of
guilty plea); rule 735(d) (waiver of right to jury trial); and rule 746 (speedy trial).
Id
13. Id at 571, 446 A.2d at 855.
14. Id at 573, 446 A.2d at 856.
15. Id
16. Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 574, 446 A.2d 844, 856 (1982) (Cole, J., dissenting).
17. Id
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less error doctrine,' 8 it appears that a majority of jurisdictions specifi-
cally apply it to violations of the defendant's right of presence deeming
this to be a substantial right.' 9 Thus errors which deprive the accused
of a substantial right require reversal. 20 For example, denial of a sub-
stantial right occurs when there is a change in the composition of the
jury in the absence of the defendant and his counsel.2 ' However, a
deprivation of a substantial right would not occur when the accused
was temporarily absent during voir dire and the judge deferred the jury
selection until the defendant returned.22 A small minority of courts
refuse to apply harmless error to situations where the defendant is de-
nied his right to be present, finding it too difficult to determine the
amount of prejudice suffered by him.23
Maryland courts have on occasion followed both the majority and
minority views in applying harmless error. The earliest Maryland case
on the subject, Duffy v. State,24 held that the Maryland Constitution
gave the defendant the right to be present at all stages of the trial and
therefore courts could not speculate as to whether the defendant was
injured.25 If the record was unclear, prejudice to the defendant was
presumed.26 Subsequent cases accepted that reasoning in part, but held
that if the record affirmatively indicated that a violation of the defend-
ant's right to be present was not prejudicial and had no tendency to
influence the verdict then the error would be deemed harmless and no
reversal would be required.27
In order to reconcile the defendant's right to be present with the
18. See Note, Harmless Constitutional Error.- A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REV. 814
(1970) (all fifty states and the federal government have a harmless error rule man-
dated by either constitution, statute, judicial rule or decision); see also Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (all fifty states have harmless error statutes or
rules).
i9. See, e.g., Noble v. State 293 Md. 549, 564 n.7, 446 A.2d 844, 851 n.7 (1982) (citing
to Duffy v. State, 151 Md. 456, 473-75, 135 A. 189, 195-96 (1926)); see also Bryan
v. State, 141 Fla. 676, 194 So. 385 (1940); State v. Bryant, 281 N.W.2d 712 (Minn.
1979); People v. Ganett, 68 A.D.2d 81, 416 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1979).
20. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976) (on appeal or writ of certiorari, the court gives
judgment after an examination of the record, without regard to errors which do
not affect substantial rights of the parties).
21. United States v. Gay, 522 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1975).
22. State v. Isaac, 261 La. 487, 260 So.2d 302 (1972).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968) (remand is man-
dated when there is no way to assess the prejudice that may have occurred to the
defendant), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969). But cf. United States v. Dioguardi,
428 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.) (harmless error applied when defendants sat fifteen to
twenty feet away from the side bar where soir dire occurred), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
825 (1970).
24. 151 Md. 456, 135 A. 189 (1926).
25. "[I]n dealing with an absolute constitutional right, the accused should not be at
the mercy of speculation as to whether the violation of it did or did not injure
him." Id at 476, 135 A. at 196.
26. Id
27. See, e.g., Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 36-37, 139 A.2d 209, 214 (1958); LaGuar-
dia v. State, 190 Md. 450, 458, 58 A.2d 913, 917 (1948).
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application of the doctrine of harmless error, some Maryland courts
focused on whether the defendant's absence during a stage of the trial
had a tendency to influence the verdict. In Midgett v. State, 28 a defend-
ant was ruled to have the absolute right to be present when the court
answered a supplemental jury question in writing because such action
constituted a stage of the trial.29 However, the Midgett court also held
that a violation of the right to be present would be harmless if the error
did not tend to influence the verdict.3° The court of special appeals in
Young v. State3 attempted to clarify Midgett's application of harmless
error. Young viewed the written answering of supplemental jury ques-
tions as mere "communications" and not as a stage in the defendant's
trial.32 Thus, Young limited the defendant's right to be present to only
"instructions" or charges from the court to the jury in regard to the
facts, law, or form of the verdict.33
In Noble v. State, 34 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a
violation of the defendant's right to be present at all stages of the trial
could constitute harmless error, if a reviewing court determined beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict.35 A
decisive factor in the Noble decision was the court of appeals' view that
Young had erroneously interpreted Midgett by distinguishing between
"communications" and "instructions. '36 Based on Midgett, Young held
that a jury "instruction" was a stage of the trial and harmless error was
therefore inapplicable. 37 Young further held that a mere "communica-
tion" with the jury was not a stage of the trial and thus the harmless
error doctrine would be applicable. 38 The Noble court held that it
would be illogical to apply harmless error to events which did not con-
stitute a stage of the trial because a criminal defendant would have no
right to be present; thus, the defendant's absence would normally not
be error.3 9 Furthermore, the court of appeals noted that Midgett had
dealt with events constituting stages of the trial.4"
The Noble court's approach to applying harmless error is logi-
cal and exemplifies judicial common sense. The decision now brings
28. 216 Md. 26, 139 A.2d 209 (1958).
29. Id at 36-37, 139 A.2d at 214.
30. Id In reaching its holding, the Midgett court relied on LaGuardia v. State, 190
Md. 450, 58 A.2d 913 (1948). Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 36-37, 139 A.2d 209,
214-15 (1958).
31. 5 Md. App. 383, 247 A.2d 751 (1968).
32. Id at 390, 391, 247 A.2d at 755, 756.
33. Id
34. 293 Md. 549, 446 A.2d 844 (1982).
35. Id. at 568-69, 446 A.2d at 854.
36. Id. at 567-68, 446 A.2d at 853. The Noble court did not overrule Young because
there were alternative grounds for its decision. Id at 569 n.9, 446 A.2d at 854 n.9.
37. Young v. State, 5 Md. App. 383, 390, 391, 247 A.2d 751, 755, 756 (1968).
38. Id.
39. Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 568, 446 A.2d 844, 853 (1982).
40. Id. at 567-68, 446 A.2d at 853.
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Maryland into line with the majority of jurisdictions.4 It is essential
that the doctrine of harmless error be applicable to violations of some
procedural rules. The cost in terms of judicial resources, time, money,
and basic fairness would be too high if reversal was mandated for every
technical violation.42 Furthermore, the fear expressed by the Noble
dissent is not likely to be realized because the defendant will always
have the right to appeal and the reviewing court will carefully review
the record to determine whether harmless error is indicated or a rever-
sal mandated.43
The Noble decision clears up a great deal of confusion and pro-
tects the courts from frivolous grounds for appeal. However, as great
as the need is for efficiency in the courts, it is not as great as are the
rights of the accused. Thus, the application of harmless error to viola-
tions of the defendant's rights must be exercised with great and sensi-
tive discretion in order to guard against the possibility of prejudicing
the defendant.
Gary David Raffel
41. The majority of jurisdictions apply the harmless error principle to violations of
procedural rules. See Note, Harmless Constitutional Error.- A Reappraisal, 83
HARV. L. REV. 814 (1970). The federal system in particular embraces this view by
codifying the harmless error rule in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
42. See United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 949 (1981) where the Third Circuit stated:
By automatically requiring a new trial every time there was a minis-
cule infraction of the rule requiring presence at jury impaneling, even
when the defendant presented only the most speculative claim of poten-
tial prejudice, we would be sacrificing considerable judicial resources
without a corresponding increase in the actual fairness of trial.
637 F.2d at 143 n.22.
43. The Noble decision has already been followed by the court of special appeals in
Couser v. State, 52 Md. App. 81, 447 A.2d 105 (1982). Couser held that Noble's
application of harmless error to those situations where a defendant was excluded
from a bench conference would apply and for that reason the case was remanded
to the hearing court to determine whether Couser's absence from a bench confer-
ence was indeed harmless. Couser identified a trilogy of questions, based on
Maryland case law, which should guide post-conviction courts when reversal of
convictions are sought due to the defendant's absence at a stage of the trial:
(1) Did the defendant validly waive his right to be present?; (2) Was the violation
of the defendant's right of presence harmless error?; and (3) Were the violations of
the defendant's rights corrected? Id at 83-84, 447 A.2d at 107.
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